N.A.R., Inc. v. Aubrie Vermillion : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
N.A.R., Inc. v. Aubrie Vermillion : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Derek A. Coulter; Robert T. Tateoka; Law office of Derek A. Coulter; David W. Scofield; Peters
Scofield; Atorneys for Appellant
Ronald Ady; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, N.A.R., Inc. v. Vermillion, No. 20101043 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2694
HE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
N.A.R.. INC., 
• u, 
vs. 
AUBRIE VERMILLION, 
Appellee. 
Appellate Com 20101043-CA 
1 rial Court No. 070908175 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
APPEAL 1 ROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRIC 1 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, HON. ROBERT K. HILDER 
DEREK A. COULTER 
ROBERT T. TATEOKA 
Law Office of Derek A. Coulter, P.C. 
11576 South State Street, Ste. 503 
Draper UT 84020 
Tel.: (801) 501-0321 
Fax:(801)307-0318 
Attorneys for Neil B. Baird, Appellant 
David W. Scofield 
Peters Scofield 
Ste. 115 Parleys Corp. Center 
2455 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Attorney for Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. 
RONALD AD\ (3b94) 
RONALD ADY, PLLC 
8 E. Broadway, Ste. 725 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Tel: (801) 530-3122 
Fax: (801) 746-3501 
Attorney for Appellee Aubrie Vermillion 
*^v# 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
N.A.R., INC., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
AUBRIE VERMILLION, 
Appellee. 
Appellate Court No. 20101043 -CA 
Trial Court No. 070908175 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, HON. ROBERT K. HILDER 
DEREK A. COULTER 
ROBERT T. TATEOKA 
Law Office of Derek A. Coulter, P.C. 
11576 South State Street, Ste. 503 
Draper UT 84020 
Tel: (801) 501-0321 
Fax:(801)307-0318 
Attorneys for Neil B. Baird, Appellant 
David W. Scofield 
Peters Scofield 
Ste. 115 Parleys Corp. Center 
2455 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Attorney for Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. 
RONALD ADY (3694) 
RONALD ADY, PLLC 
8 E. Broadway, Ste. 725 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Tel.: (801) 530-3122 
Fax:(801)746-3501 
Attorney for Appellee Aubrie Vermillion 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -iv-
Federal Cases -iv-
State Cases -iv-
State Statutes -v-
State Rules -v-
Other Authorities -v-
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
1. Whether the Appellant Baird's retention of NAR to collect his 50% 
interest in the Vermillion dental account, coupled with his written 
grant of authority to NAR to file a collection action against the 
Appellee Vermillion to enforce that 50% interest, invested NAR with 
authority to represent the Appellant Baird's interest in that collection 
action 1 
2. Whether the three requirements for claim preclusion (i.e., same 
parties or privies, a claim that was raised or should have raised in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prior action, a final judgment on the merits) were present when the 
trial court ruled that the Appellant Baird's attorney fees claim was 
precluded by the settlement '. 
Whether the fact that a written settlement agreement was never 
executed by the parties or the Appellant Baird negates the settlement. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 2 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 10 
IX. ARGUMENT 11 
A. DR. BAIRD WAS IN PRIVITY WITH NAR 11 
i. The Appellant Baird Retained a 50% Interest in the Collection 
Action 11 
-in-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ii. The Appellant Baird Invested NAR with Authority to Collect 
the Vermillion Account for the Appellant 14 
iii. The Appellant Baird's Status as an Owner of the Collection 
Account, Not his Status as a Witness, Makes Him a Privy to 
NAR 16 
iv. The Appellant Baird Specifically Invested NAR with Authority 
to Bring the Collection Action on His Behalf. 18 
v. The Appellant Baird Has Not Provided Any Evidence to 
Support His Claimed Non-Involvement in the Settlement. .. 20 
vi. The Bodell Construction Decision Does Not Decide the Issue 
of Privity 24 
B. THE APPELLANT BAIRD IS PRECLUDED FROM RE-LITIGATING HIS 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIM 26 
C. IN UTAH SETTLEMENTS ARE STRONGLY FAVORED 28 
X. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 30 
ADDENDUM 31 
-iv-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases 
In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 69 B.R. 602 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y. 1987) 19, 20 
State Cases 
Baxter v. Dept. OfTransp., 705 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985) 16, 17 
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, 19 Cal.2d 807, 
122 P.2d 892 (1942) 17, 18 
Bodell Construction Company v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, 215 P.3d 933 (Utah) . 25-27 
Brigham Young v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, f 32, 110 P.3d 678 (Utah 
2005) 17-19 
Dennis. Vasquez, 2003 UT App 168, fflf 3-9, 72 P.3d 135 (Ut. App. 2003) . . . . 2, 29 
Elm, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah App. 1998) 1,12 
Forrester v. Cook et al, 11 Utah 137, 144, 292 P. 206 (1930) 23 
Gerard v. Young, 432 P.2d 343, 20 Utah 2d 30, 35 (Utah 1967) 23 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) 30 
In re Adoption ofE.K, 2004 UT App 419, ffl[ 12-13, 103 P.3d 177 (UT App 2004) 
30 
Mack v. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47, f 30, 221 P.3d 194 (Utah 2009) 28, 29 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987) 30, 31 
Press Pub. Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Intern. Ltd., 2001 UT 106, \ 20, 37 P.3d 1121, 
(Utah2001) 24, 27 
-v-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361,1364 (Utah 1996) 28 
Searle Brothers v. Searle, Utah, 588 P.2d 689 (1978) 17, 19 
Stafford v. Yerge, 129 Cal.App.2d 165, 276 P.2d 649 (1954) 18 
Terry & Wright of Kentucky v. Crick, 418 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1967) 17 
Ward v. Ihc Health Serv., 2007 UT App 362, ^ 7, 173 P.3d 186 (UT App 2007). . . . 2 
Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478,482 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) 31 
State Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 12-1-8 12, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq 9 
State Rules 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 26(c) 31 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1) 5 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(C) 5 
Ut. R. Civ. P. Rule 45 5 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 59 6 
Other Authorities 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982) 27 
-vi-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 25 (1982) 28 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 39 (1982) 19 
Restatement (Second) Judgments, § 41 (1982) 15, 19-21 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 43(1) (1982) 19, 28 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Ch. 4 (1982) 19 
18 Wright and Miller at Section 4407, p.62 28 
-vii-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Appellee Aubrie Vermillion concurs in the Appellant's Jurisdictional 
Statement. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
At issue in this appeal is whether the Appellant Baird is precluded by a 
settlement agreement between the collection agency he retained, NAR, Inc., and the 
Appellee Vermillion where that settlement agreement resolved all claims, including claims 
for attorney fees, between the parties. The specific issues to be resolved are: 
1. Whether the Appellant Baird's retention of NAR to collect his 50% interest in 
the Vermillion dental account, coupled with his written grant of authority to 
NAR to file a collection action against the Appellee Vermillion to enforce that 
50% interest, invested NAR with authority to represent the Appellant Baird's 
interest in that collection action. 
Standard of Review: [A] trial court's interpretation of the words of an 
unambiguous, integrated contract is a question of law, which is reviewed on appeal 
for correctness. Elm, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah App. 
1998). 
Preservation of the Issue Below: AR 935-938; 986-991. 
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2. Whether the three requirements for claim preclusion (i.e., same parties or 
privies, a claim that was raised or should have raised in the prior action, a final 
judgment on the merits) were present when the trial court ruled that the 
Appellant Baird's attorney fees claim was precluded by the settlement. 
Standard of Review: The issue of claim preclusion is legal question 
which is reviewed for correctness granting no deference. Dennis. Vasquez, 2003 UT 
App 168, Tffl 3-9, 72 P.3d 135 (Ut. App. 2003). 
Preservation of the Issue Below: AR 1041-1043; 1075-1077. 
3. Whether the fact that a written settlement agreement was never executed by the 
parties or the Appellant Baird negates the settlement. 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of unambiguous contracts is also 
a question of law, "and on such questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no 
presumption of correctness." Ward v. Ihc Health Serv., 2007 UT App 362, ^ [7, 173 
P.3d 186 (UTApp 2007). 
Preservation of the Issue Below: AR 938-940. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations that 
pertain to this appeal are identified in the Table of Authorities and are fully set forth 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in the body of this brief or in the addendum. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns litigation commenced by the collection agency NAR, Inc. 
at the specific request of the Appellant Baird, AR 865-866, ffi[ 1, 8, t o c o ^ e c t o n e °f 
his dental accounts on a 50% commission (leaving 50% for the Appellant Baird), AR 
868, and his demurrer to NAR's settlement agreement with the Appellee Vermillion 
which disposed of the Appellant Baird's claim to attorney fees - a settlement 
agreement which could only be entered into by NAR with the Appellant Baird's prior 
approval. AR 866, ^  9. The Appellant Baird, who throughout the litigation before the 
trial court retained a 50% ownership of the collection account being sued upon, AR 
868, was present in the courtroom when the issue of settlement was first raised at the 
commencement of the trial of the action on July 7, 2009. AR 1042, ^ j 4. When the 
possibility of settlement was put before the trial court, a short recess in the trial was 
ordered and the parties, including the Appellant Baird, adjourned to the small 
conference rooms immediately adjacent to the courtroom for settlement discussions. 
Id. 
After an agreement on settlement was reached, the settlement agreement was 
recited into the record by the parties. AR 1110, pp. 3-10. The Appellant Baird was 
present in the courtroom during the recitation of the settlement agreement. AR 1042, 
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14. Shortly after his return to his office on July 7, 2009, the Appellant Baird 
informed his legal counsel of the settlement agreement. AR 1042,16. No written 
settlement agreement was ever signed by the parties. Instead, in executing the 
settlement agreement the parties have relied upon a transcript of the proceedings 
before the trial court. The Appellant Baird does not contest the terms of the settlement 
agreement and has never moved to set aside or amend that settlement agreement. AR 
1043, % 9. The Appellant Baird made no further inquiry regarding the settlement 
agreement, but did not renew his claim for attorney fees until after the parties had 
fully performed the settlement agreement. AR 1043, fflf 7, 8. 
The Appellant contends that the settlement agreement cannot be applicable to 
him, otherwise he cannot vindicate his claim to attorney fees from the Appellee 
Vermillion and her legal counsel. His claim for more than $10,000.00 in attorney fees 
is based on his objection to the subpoena duces tecum served upon him by the 
Appellee Vermillion within three weeks after NAR commenced its collection action 
on behalf of Dr. Baird (the Vermillion collection action). The Appellant at first 
responded to that subpoena, and had extensive discussions with the Appellee 
Vermillion's legal counsel about responding to that subpoena, AR 607-608, but then 
retained legal counsel. 
The Appellant Baird's legal counsel, Mr. Coulter, faxed a letter to Plaintiffs 
counsel on the afternoon of Thursday, June 28, 2007 expressing concern regarding 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the scope of the Defendant's subpoena and requesting a conference. AR 610. The 
following Monday, July 2, 2007 Defendant's counsel contacted Mr. Coulter's office 
to confer regarding the subpoena. AR 591. Mr. Coulter's office informed Defendant's 
counsel that Mr. Coulter was out of the office until after July 5,2007. AR 614. On 
Tuesday, July 3, 2007 Mr. Coulter's office served Defendant's counsel with a Motion 
to Quash the subpoena, id, thus prematurely cutting off the opportunity for counsel to 
confer, as required by Rule 26(c), prior to that motion to quash being filed. 
Mr. Coutler's June 28, 2007 letter was a written objection to the Defendant's 
subpoena to the Appellant Baird. Because his evidence was at the core of the 
Appellee Vermillion's defense of the Vermillion collection action, Defendant needed 
to take his deposition. Ut R. Civ, P. 30(a)(1) provides that the attendance of a non-
party witness may be compelled pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(c)(2)(C) provides that 
in the event of a written objection (i.e., Mr. Coulter's June 28, 2007 letter) to a 
subpoena, the documents subpoenaed need not be produced until further order of the 
court issuing the subpoena. Id. To obtain such an order, the Rule provides that the 
party serving the subpoena may bring a motion to compel compliance with the 
subpoena. Id. 
As required by Rule 45(c)(2)(C), on July 23, 2007 the Appellee Vermillion 
responded to the Appellant Baird's written objection by filing a motion to compel Dr. 
Baird's compliance with the subpoena. AR 56. The trial court denied that motion. AR 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
178. 
On September 11, 2007, the trial court granted the Plaintiff summary judgment 
on its collection claim. AR 180. The Defendant filed a Rule 59 motion, AR 223, 
seeking reversal of that order, which the trial court granted. AR 309. However, 
because the Appellee Vermillion had mis-captioned her Rule 59 motion as a "Motion 
to Compel Discovery and Motion for Sanctions," on October 19, 2007 the Appellant 
Baird filed a memorandum opposing Defendant's Rule 59 motion and then sought 
attorney fees for his involvement in the litigation before the trial court. AR 240, 245-
246. Shortly before it was filed, the Appellant Baird's memorandum was faxed to the 
Appellee Vermillion on October 19, 2007, AR 616, and her counsel immediately 
faxed a letter, AR 618, to Mr. Coulter explaining that the motion, AR 223, was mis-
captioned (note that the supporting memorandum was properly captioned as a Rule 
59 memorandum, AR 207), and that the body of the motion and its supporting 
memorandum were directed solely to relief under Rule 59 as a result of the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling. AR 618-619. 
At this point the Appellant Baird's alleged claim for attorney fees - based on 
the erroneous claim that he was wrongfully compelled to defend himself against 
Defendant's subpoena, and that he was wrongfully compelled to defend himself 
against the Defendant's Rule 59 motion, was $720.00. AR 743-744. As a result of 
successive voluntary interventions by the Appellant Baird into the litigation, during 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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which he repeatedly pressed for sanctions against the Appellee Vermillion and her 
legal counsel, his claim for attorney fees mushroomed to over $10,000.00. The 
history of that intervention and the Appellant Baird's claim for sanctions is detailed at 
AR 892-908. 
VIL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The underlying litigation in the trial court concerned the debt collector NAR's 
attempt to collect for Neal Baird, D.D.S., a dental account which the Defendant, 
Aubrie Vermillion, protested grossly exceeded the explicit amount agreed to with the 
Appellant Baird for the dental work he performed on her teeth. Ms. Vermillion 
contended that once she had paid the agreed fee of $1,080.00 (which reflected a 10% 
discount for cash) she had paid to Dr. Baird all that she agreed to pay. AR 186, 659-
660. As well, Ms. Vermillion defended the Vermillion collection action on the basis 
that the account was also not owing because Dr. Baird had failed to complete his 
work by not placing a crown on one tooth he had reduced, and because the other 
crown he had placed on one of Ms. Vermillion's teeth had repeatedly fallen off and 
needed to be redone. AR 187-189. 
The Appellee Vermillion had become a patient of the Appellant Baird as a 
result of receiving from his office an auto-dialer recorded solicitation on her 
telephone for a free tooth cleaning. AR 662-663. The Appellee Vermillion had one of 
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her children attend for a tooth cleaning at the Appellant Baird's office, and 
subsequently attended for root canals and crowns on her own teeth. AR 185, 662-663 
Prior to having that work done, the VermilHons attended at the Appellant 
Baird's office to inform him that, due to her husband's reduced hours at work because 
of injuries he received in an automobile accident, they could not proceed with the 
dental work on the Appellee Vermillion unless it was covered by her husband's 
dental insurance through Aetna. In response, Dr. Baird's staff advised the VermilHons 
that Dr. Baird's charges would not exceed the amount paid by Aetna by more than 
$50.00. The VermilHons advised that with that assurance as to the cost of the 
Appellant Baird's dental services they would proceed with the dental work on the 
Appellee Vermillion's teeth. AR 185-186, 659-660. 
The Appellant Baird's agreement for his services stated that payment was not 
due until his dental work was complete. AR 103. 
There were problems with Dr. Baird's dental work on the Appellee 
Vermillion's teeth. After performing a root canal and reducing one tooth so that it 
could receive a crown, the Appellee Vermillion was still feeling significant pain in 
that tooth. AR 187. She was informed by the Appellant Baird that she needed to see a 
specialist (i.e., an endodontist) to ensure that the root canal had eliminated the entire 
nerve in that reduced tooth. Id. 
The Appellee Vermillion advised that she could not afford to see a specialist at 
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that time. Id. The Appellant Baird removed the crown from her tooth, leaving the 
reduced tooth exposed, and advised the Appellee Vermillion to see a specialist. This 
occurred in November of 2006. AR 188-189. During the time the Appellee 
Vermillion was still attempting to resolve her billing dispute with the Appellant 
Baird5s office, the Vermillion account was referred to NAR for collection. AR 190. 
Ms. Vermillion then tried to resolve her billing dispute with NAR, and while waiting 
for a response from it, she was advised that the Olson law firm was filing a legal 
action. AR 191-192. 
When the Appellee was able to see an endodontist, he advised that the 
exposed tooth had decayed to the point that it must be extracted, and that the Appellee 
must pay for an implant or bridge. AR 192-193. 
For these reasons, the Appellee Vermillion contested the NAR collection 
action, and then later amended her pleading and counterclaimed against NAR under 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. AR 344-
352. 
At the trial of the action on July 7, 2007 the parties settled all claims, including 
claims regarding the parties, their officers, agents, Dr. Baird, his officers, agents, and 
attorneys. AR 1110, pp.4:20-5:4. The Appellant Baird was present throughout these 
proceedings. AR 1042, ^ f 4. Shortly after his return to his office on July 7,2009, the 
Appellant Baird informed his legal counsel of the settlement agreement. AR 1042, <| 
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6. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellant Baird repeatedly asserts that other than acting as a witness, he 
had no involvement in the prior litigation. But he offers no evidence to support this 
assertion. The only evidence before the trial court and before this Court proves that he 
retained NAR to collect on a dental account he claimed was owing to him from the 
Appellee Vermillion. His agreement with NAR provided that the Appellant Baird 
would pay NAR a 50% commission for bringing the collection action, and that he 
would retain 50% for himself. The agreement specifically provided that the Appellant 
Baird was authorizing NAR to bring the collection action, that he could withdraw the 
action if he so chose, and that the action could not be settled without his approval. 
The Appellant Baird has never provided any proof that the settlement by NAR 
disposing of his claim to attorney fees was entered into without his approval. 
By investing NAR with the authority to collect the dental account from the 
Appellee Vermillion, the Appellant Baird made NAR his privy. The attorney fees 
claim that is the motivation for this appeal was specifically disposed of by that 
settlement agreement. A final judgment was entered on the merits disposing of that 
attorney fees claim. It is undisputed that the attorney fees claim the Appellant Baird 
wishes to continue litigating involves the same parties and was the same attorney fees 
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claim resolved by the settlement agreement. Thus, all three requirements for claim 
preclusion have been met and the Appellant Baird's claim for attorney fees is 
precluded by the final judgment entered as a result of the settlement. 
Settlements are strongly favored in Utah law, and the fact that the settlement 
agreement was merely recited into the record of the trial court and was never 
translated into a formal written agreement signed by the parties does not, under 
controlling legal precedent, lessen its effectiveness. In short, the only evidence is that 
the Appellant's claim for attorney fees was settled pursuant to an agreement approved 
by him, he is bound by that settlement agreement, and his appeal should be denied on 
this basis. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. DR. BAIRD WAS IN PRIVITY WITH NAR. 
L The Appellant Baird Retained a 50% Interest in the Collection Action. 
The Appellant Baird recites in isolation text from paragraph 1 of the 
Assignment Agreement between the Appellant and N.A.R. to argue that he retained 
no interest in the Vermillion dental account. Aplt. Br., p. 10. However, a few 
sentences from an agreement cannot be considered in isolation but must be read in the 
context of the entire agreement. Elm, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 
(Utah App. 1998) (a "contract should be read as a whole, in an attempt to harmonize 
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and give effect to all of the contract provisions." (internal citations omitted)).Based on 
his unconventional reading of this particular text, the Appellant Baird mistakenly 
argues that he appeared in the action solely as a disinterested witness. 
In fact, a full reading of the Assignment Agreement discloses just the opposite. 
The Appellant Baird: 
1. Assigned over a 33.34% to50% interest in his dental accounts to NAR for 
the "purpose of collection" (but not to transfer fee simple ownership), thus invoking 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 12-1-8 ("Any collector having complied with the 
provisions of this chapter, may receive accounts, bills or other indebtedness, take 
assignments for the purpose of collections, and at the direction of the assignor bring 
suit as assignee . . . ."); AR 865,11 
2. Retained a 50% interest in his dental accounts in the event they went to 
litigation and NAR's "commission" was increased to 50%; AR 868 
3. Retained the right to to instruct NAR not to proceed to litigation in 
collecting any particular dental account; AR 866, ^ f 8. 
4. Retained control over NAR's reduction, settlement or compromise of an 
assigned dental account - including the Vermillion account and the settlement at issue 
in this appeal; AR 866, Tf 9. 
5. Retained the right to withdraw from collection by NAR any dental account 
the Appellant Baird had sent to NAR for collection. AR 866, f 10. In the event NAR 
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had filed a collection action on a Baird dental account, the Appellant Baird was 
required to reimburse NAR for attorney fees and costs it had incurred to the date of 
withdrawal. Id. 
6. Received payment for an assigned dental account only in the event NAR 
collected on the account; AR 866, ^ j 6, 7. 
7. Agreed to indemnify and hold harmless NAR from any counterclaim that a 
defendant debtor, like the Appellee Vermillion, filed against NAR. This 
indemnification also required the Appellant Baird to "pay the costs, fees and expenses 
incurred by NAR and/or the NAR Parties in connection with Defending against any 
such Claim." Thus, when the Defendant Vermillion filed her counterclaim against 
NAR, the Appellant Baird was required by the terms of the Assignment Agreement to 
pay the legal fees NAR incurred in defending the Appellee Vermillion's 
counterclaim. AR 865-866, ^  5. 
Note that the assignment in issue concerned a collection account. A collection 
account has a very limited scope - the recovery of a specified amount of money from 
the alleged account debtor. That is the sum and substance of a collection account. In 
relation to the Vermillion account, the Appellant Baird retained a 50% interest in any 
money recovered from her in NAR's collection action. The only damages sought in 
the Vermillion collection action were money damages, and the Appellant Baird 
retained a 50% interest in those damages. Consequently, the Appellant Baird retained 
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a frill 50% interest of the collection account assigned to NAR, and the Appellant had 
- at the least - an equal interest with NAR in the collection action. Arguably, because 
he retained such a large degree of control over the Vermillion dental account, he had 
a greater than 50% interest. 
ii. The Appellant Baird Invested NAR with Authority to Collect the 
Vermillion Account for the Appellant. 
Moreover, the Vermillion collection action was assigned to NAR for the 
specific purpose of investing NAR with authority to collect the Appellant Baird's 
50% interest for him. Under the Restatement (Second) of Judgments: 
§ 41(1) A person who is not a party to an action but who is represented 
by a party is bound by and entitled to the benefits of a judgment as 
though he were a party. A person is represented by a party who is: 
(b) Invested by the person with authority to represent him in an 
action . . . . 
iJ^ 2$£ i?£ J^> *l£ S!^  \!^ SJJ£ *$£ iff 5?f 2$£ i?£ 
(2) A person represented by a party to an action is bound by the 
judgment even though the person himself does not have notice of the 
action is not served with process, or is not subject to service of process. 
Restatement (Second) Judgments § 41 at 393 (1982). 
Further, NAR only filed the collection action after the Appellant Baird 
approved of its filing, he had the option to withdraw the Vermillion account from 
litigation, and that collection action could not be settled without "prior approval" by 
the Appellant, which is additional confirmation that the Appellant Baird invested 
NAR with authority to collect on the Vermillion dental account for him. AR 865-868. 
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Clearly, the Appellant Baird not only retained a full 50% interest in the NAR 
collection action, he directly controlled the decision to commence the collection 
action against the Appellee Vermillion, and directly controlled the decision to settle 
the NAR collection action with the Appellee Vermillion. 
Although the text recited by the Appellant Baird, in isolation, appears to refer 
to a fee simple assignment to NAR, the sentence preceding that text recites that dental 
accounts are assigned "for the purpose of collection" and the sentence following that 
text recites that the assignment was "subject to the limitations contained herein . . . . " 
Thus, this text invokes the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 12-1-8, which provides 
that a debt collector can take an assignment of a debt from the creditor and file a legal 
action on that debt as assignee, so long as the creditor directs the debt collector to 
"bring suit as assignee." Id. And as is shown above, the contractual limitations in the 
Assignment Agreement, AR 865-867, disclose that the Appellant Baird retained 
almost total control over the dental accounts assigned, subject to NAR's 33.34% or 
50% commission, and subject to NAR's right to reimbursement for costs, attorney 
fees, and counterclaims successfully alleged against it in collecting one of the 
Appellant Baird's dental accounts. Id. 
The facts recited above belie the Appellant Baird's assertion that he was a mere 
witness that did not have any control over, interest in, or involvement in the 
Vermillion collection action. The sole support for these assertions is the Appellant's 
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idiosyncratic construction of an excerpt from paragraph 1 of the Assignment 
Agreement, and as a matter of law that construction is erroneous. 
iii. The Appellant Baird's Status as an Owner of the Collection Account, 
Not his Status as a Witness, Makes Him a Privy to NAR. 
In Baxter v. Dept. Of Tramp., 705 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985) the court rejected the 
assertion that a party could be collaterally estopped merely because it had been a 
witness in the prior litigation. Id at 1168-1169. But the court went on to note that 
some of the cases cited by UDOT involved situations where the party precluded was 
not merely a witness in the prior litigation. One of the cases cited by Baxter, Terry & 
Wright of Kentucky v. Crick, 418 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1967) followed the rule adopted in 
Baxter at 1168-1169 that acting as a witness in prior litigation did not preclude a 
party from proceeding on the same claim in subsequent litigation. Terry & Wright at 
219. But the court in Terry & Wright distinguished its prior case authority refusing to 
preclude a party who had acted as a witness in a prior proceeding, because in the case 
before the court the party to be precluded not only acted as a witness, but his damages 
claim was also fully litigated in the prior action. Id. 
Admittedly, Baxter concerns a claim of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, 
and it is claim preclusion which is at issue in this appeal. See Brigham Young v. 
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, \ 32, 110 P.3d 678 (Utah 2005) (noting that 
"the concept of privity based on a nonparty's control of litigation is applicable to the 
doctrine of issue preclusion, but not to the doctrine of claim preclusion."). But Baxter, 
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and the Terry & Wright decision it cites, nevertheless establish that a monetary 
interest in the prior litigation will preclude a party in subsequent litigation. 
Baxter also noted that in: "Searle Brothers v. Searle, Utah, 588 P.2d 
689 (1978), we adopted the test set forth in Bernhard v. Bank of America National 
Trust & Savings Association, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), to determine when 
a party is collaterally estopped from litigating an issue . . . . " Another California 
decision, Stafford v. Yerge, 129 Cal.App.2d 165, 276 P.2d 649 (1954) applied the 
holding in Bernhard to find that the assignee of an leasehold interest in an oil and gas 
well was a privy of his assignor and so was precluded by prior litigation involving his 
assignor. Stafford at 170. The court summed up its holding that the plaintiff in the 
action was precluded by finding that: 
[I]t appears that at all times during the [prior] litigation plaintiff was the 
owner of a substantial interest in the subject matter of that action. 
Although not a party plaintiff therein, he obviously exercised certain 
control and direction of that litigation through the plaintiffs for he had a 
financial interest in any favorable judgment plaintiffs might have 
obtained. 
Id at 173. Although under Tremco at ^ f 32 the "control of litigation" element is not a 
requirement in cases involving claim preclusion, nevertheless the fact that the 
Stafford court inferred control because the plaintiff had a financial interest in the prior 
litigation demonstrates that a financial interest in the prior litigation is a critical 
element in finding that a party is precluded. 
Here, the Appellant Baird retained NAR for the specific purpose of collecting 
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on his 50% interest in the Vermillion dental account, he reserved to himself specific 
authority to approve the commencement of any litigation regarding that account, he 
retained authority to withdraw that account from litigation, and he held sole control 
over the approval of the settlement agreement NAR entered into with the Appellee 
Vermillion. Obviously, the Appellant Baird's financial interest in the Vermillion 
dental account placed him in privity with NAR when it concluded the settlement with 
Ms. Vermillion. 
iv. The Appellant Baird Specifically Invested NAR with Authority to Bring 
the Collection Action on His Behalf. 
Turning again to Searle Bros., it went on to hold that: 
The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so 
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. 
This includes a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property. 
Our Court has said that as applied to judgments or decrees of court, 
privity means "one whose interest has been legally represented at the 
time." 
Id at 691. (footnotes omitted). This legal definition closely parallels the definition in § 
41 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgment, quoted above. In deciding the 
arguments regarding issue preclusion placed before it, Tremco repeatedly cites to the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments provisions, §§39 and 43(1), on claim and issue 
preclusion to reach its decision, Id at fflf 29 -32, and cited to ch. 4 of the Restatement 
generally. Id. Section 41 is part of ch. 4 of the Restatement, and in light of Tremco's 
citation to Chapter 4 of the Restatement, it seems fair to conclude that § 41 should 
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also be recognized as authoritative. 
In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 69 B.R. 602 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y. 1987) 
applied § 41 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to preclude an assignee of a 
lease from re-litigating claims litigated by its assignor in a prior civil action. At issue 
was a provision in the assignment which gave the assignor full authority "to appear in 
and defend any action or proceeding arising under, growing out of or in any manner 
connected with the Lease . . . . " Id at 608. The court applied § 41 to this provision to 
hold that because the assignee had invested its assignor with authority to litigate 
issues on behalf of the assignee, see § 41(l)(b), it was bound by that prior litigation 
even though it had never received formal notice of the commencement of the prior 
litigation and did not know of its commencement until some two years later. Id at 
604. In so holding the court applied § 41(2) which states: 
A person represented by a party to an action is bound by the judgment 
even though the person himself does not have notice of the action is not 
served with process, or is not subject to service of process. 
Id. 
The holding and rationale of In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp. fully applies 
to the Appellant Baird. He explicitly assigned to NAR dental accounts "for 
collection" and granted NAR "full power to . . . in any manner . . . enforce the 
collection thereof,"AR 865, Tj 1, and then further provided to NAR authority to 
commence legal action "if NAR determines legal action is required to collect an 
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Assigned Account/' AR 866, f 8, so long as NAR first notified Dr. Baird of its intent 
to commence a legal action on a dental account and subject to his prompt notification 
that legal action was not to be commenced against the account. Id. Thus, the 
Appellant Baird invested NAR "with authority to represent him in [the Vermillion] 
action." Restatement (Second) Judgments § 41(l)(b). Further, Dr. Baird's assertion 
that he was never named as a party in the Vermillion collection action and his errant 
assertion that he did not know of the settlement are irrelevant to the determination of 
whether he was in privity with NAR. See Restatement (Second) Judgments § 41(2). 
In short, the above analysis and the cases recited above confirm that the 
Appellant Baird was in privity with NAR on the Vermillion collection account. 
v. The Appellant Baird Has Not Provided Any Evidence to Support His 
Claimed Non-Involvement in the Settlement. 
Although Dr. Baird's opening brief attempts to gainsay his alleged non-
involvement by repeatedly asserting, without proof, that he did not have a direct and 
immediate financial interest in the Vermillion collection action, and that he did not 
assert any control over that litigation, the Assignment Agreement rebuts these 
assertions. AR 865-867. Indeed, paragraph 9 of the Assignment Agreement gave the 
Appellant Baird complete approval authority over the settlement he now contests, but 
the Appellant failed - despite ample opportunity to do so - to file an affidavit in the 
trial court, or otherwise adduce evidence, demonstrating that NAR was in breach of 
that term of the Assignment Agreement. Dr. Baird provides no proof on this issue, 
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only his own unsupported assertions. Of course, those unsupported assertions are not 
evidence. Accordingly, the only evidence before this Court is that the Appellant Baird 
specifically approved of or ratified the settlement he now contests in this appeal. 
This conclusion becomes even more compelling when the timing of the 
Appellant Baird's challenge of the parties' settlement is considered. On July 7, 2009, 
the settlement agreement was stated on the record during the trial of the action. Then, 
on October 2, 2009, after the settlement check had been cashed, the Appellant Baird 
renewed his spurious motion for attorney fees which, in effect, asserted that the 
Appellant Baird was not bound by the settlement. The Appellant Baird was present 
during the settlement negotiations between the parties and heard the settlement 
agreement recited into the record before the trial court. Yet, at no time has the 
Appellant Baird adduced any evidence to show that NAR proceeded to execute on the 
settlement in violation of paragraph 9 of the Assignment Agreement. 
Such evidence lies exclusively within the control of the Appellant Baird, but 
in the nine months of post-settlement litigation before the trial court he failed to adduce 
any evidence demonstrating that NAR was not in complete compliance with 
paragraph 9 of the Assignment Agreement. Stated differently, the Appellant Baird 
entirely failed to adduce any evidence that NAR settled the Vermillion collection 
action "without prior approval from [Dr. Baird]." AR 866, ^  9. This creates an 
adverse evidentiary inference that if that evidence was adduced, it would be contrary 
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to the Appellant Baird's present assertion that he is not bound by the settlement. Cf 
Gerard v. Young, 432 P.2d 343, 20 Utah 2d 30, 35 (Utah 1967) where Justice Ellet in 
his concurring opinion ruled: 
In McCormick on Evidence, page 163, § 80, the following statement is 
found: Under familiar principles an unfavorable inference may be made 
against a party not only for destroying evidence, but for the mere failure 
to produce witnesses or documents within his control. No showing of 
wrong or fraud seems to be required as a foundation for the inference 
that the evidence if produced would have been unfavorable. Why should 
not this same conclusion be drawn from the party's active interposing of 
a privilege to keep out the evidence? 
Id. 
The Appellant Baird's own agreement with NAR required that he affirmatively 
approve the settlement between NAR and the Appellee Vermillion, and in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary paragraph 9 is itself evidence that the Appellant Baird 
approved NAR's settlement with the Appellee Vermillion: 
"There is a presumption that the written contract correctly evidences the 
agreement of the parties. Reformation of such an instrument will not be 
granted upon a probability and usually not upon mere preponderance of 
the evidence, but only upon certainty of the error." 
Forrester v. Cook et al, 77 Utah 137, 144, 292 P. 206 (1930). But, by analogy, the 
Appellant Baird, in effect, asks this Court to presume - all the while withholding 
evidence on this issue and despite the specific term in the Assignment Agreement to 
the contrary - that NAR settled the Vermillion collection action without the Appellant 
Baird's approval. 
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In that light, it is apparent that the Appellant Baird's assertion that he "was 
never a party to the litigation,"Aplt. Br., p.2, is true only if it is taken to mean that he 
was never a named party in the Vermillion collection action. The Assignment 
Agreement provides ample evidence that the Appellant Baird was fully represented 
by NAR in the lawsuit, and no evidence to the contrary had been provided by Dr. 
Baird. Similarly, his assertion that neither he "nor his counsel received a copy of the 
settlement Agreement," ignores the fact that the only settlement agreement was the 
one recited into the record when the Appellant Baird was present in the courtroom. 
There was never any written agreement beyond the transcript of that recitation. 
Further, Dr. Baird was present during the settlement negotiations. Although the 
Appellant Baird attaches as Addendum 1 to his brief that part of the trial transcript 
reciting the terms of the settlement agreement (i.e., the settlement agreement), he is 
careful not to say when he first acquired a copy of that transcript. 
On these facts, the Appellant Baird's status as a privy of NAR cannot be 
reasonably disputed, because "privity depends mostly on the parties' relationship to 
the subject matter of the litigation." Press Pub. Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Intern. Ltd., 
2001 UT 106, Tf 20, 37 P.3d 1121, (Utah 2001) (internal citations omitted). Because 
the assignment left the Appellant Baird with a 50% interest in the subject matter of 
the litigation, compelled him to indemnify NAR for its attorney fees, costs and 
counterclaim liability incurred in the Vermillion collection action, and provided him 
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with an active, controlling hand in the commencement of the Vermillion collection 
action, and in its settlement, his relationship to the subject matter of the Vermillion 
collection action was even closer than that of NAR. Not only was he closely related 
to the Vermillion collection litigation, that litigation was conducted to directly benefit 
him financially, which proves he was in privity with NAR. 
vi. The Bodell Construction Decision Does Not Decide the Issue of Privity 
The Appellant cites to and relies upon Bodell Construction Company v. 
Robbins, 2009 UT 52, 215 P.3d 933 (Utah) to argue that the Appellant Baird could 
not be bound by a settlement agreement which he did not sign (in point of fact, no one 
in the case below signed a settlement agreement). But Bodell does not dispose of and 
has no bearing on the issue of privity. Bodell does not address and does not purport to 
dispose of the issue of whether a settlement agreement will bind a privy of a party to 
the settlement agreement. 
By arguing the issue of privity in Part II of his brief, the Appellant Baird 
implicitly acknowledges the limited scope of BodelVs holding. If, as the Appellant 
Baird asserts, Bodell must be over-read as an all-inclusive negation of the application 
of settlement agreements to non-signatories to the agreement, then there is no need to 
argue the issue of privity. However, a fair reading of Bodell discloses that it 
addresses only the narrow issue of whether a paragraph in a settlement agreement 
releasing named defendants from the plaintiffs claims should be broadly construed as 
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an accord and satisfaction. The limited scope oiBodelVs holding is vouched for by 
the fact that in analyzing the issue of accord and satisfaction the Bodell court made 
particular reference to its refusal to consider any alternative theory for preclusion of 
Bodell's claims against non-parties to the settlement agreement. 
Thus, not only is Bodell devoid of any reference by the court to any theory, 
other than accord and satisfaction, under which the plaintiff Bodell would be 
precluded from claiming against the defendants Bank One or Robbins, at footnote 17 
the court makes it abundantly clear it is refusing to consider any issue other than 
accord and satisfaction. Id at fnl7. There, the court categorically refused to consider 
any of the seven alternative theories referred to by Bank One because these 
alternative theories were "presented to, but were not reached, by the district court," 
Id, and because "the district court is in a better position than we are at this time to rule 
on Bank One's alternative theories." Id. 
Clearly, Bodell is limited to the narrow issue of whether the settlement 
agreement in issue released only the named parties or whether it should be broadly 
construed as an accord and satisfaction which also acquitted from liability the non-
signatory third parties. By expressly reserving judgment on alternative theories for 
extending the settlement agreement's reach to non-signatory third parties, the court 
refused to decide whether alternative theories - such as privity - might apply to make 
binding upon a non-signatory, like the Appellant Baird, a settlement agreement. In 
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short, Bodell is not dispositive - for either party to this appeal - of the issue of privity. 
B. THE APPELLANT BAIRD IS PRECLUDED FROM RE-LITIGATING HIS 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIM 
So long as the other two requirements of claim preclusion are met, then the 
Appellant Baird's claim for attorney fees is precluded. Claim preclusion applies when 
three requirements are met: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, 
the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the 
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the 
first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits. 
Press Pub. Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Intern. Ltd., 2001 UT 106, lj 19. 
The Appellee Vermillion has shown above that NAR was in privity with the 
Appellant Baird. Turning to the second requirement for claim preclusion, the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982), generally prohibits a plaintiffs 
splitting of its cause of action by providing: 
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the 
plaintiffs claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar (see §§ 18, 19), 
the claim extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the 
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of 
connected transactions, out of which the action arose. 
Id. Essentially, for res judicata purposes the Restatement equates a party's claim with 
the "transaction or occurrence" test of the federal joinder rules. See 18 Wright and 
Miller at Section 4407, p.62. Under this approach, a party who has asserted a right to 
relief arising out of a particular transaction or occurrence must join all claims it has 
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arising from that transaction, or the omitted claims will be barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata. 
In Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) the court held that '"[A] 
plaintiff may not split his cause of action by seeking damages for some of his injuries 
in one suit and for later-developing injuries in another.'; see also Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments §§ 24-26 (1982)," thereby ratifying § 24 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments, and also ratifying § 25, titled "Exemplifications of General 
Rule Concerning Splitting," which provides: 
The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the 
defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) 
To present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in 
the first action, or (2) to seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded 
in the first action. 
More important, in Mack v. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47, \ 30,221 P.3d 194 (Utah 
2009), the court affirmatively adopted the transactional rule in the Restatement by 
holding: 
Claims or causes of action are the same as those brought or that could 
have been brought in the first action if they arise from the same 
operative facts, or in other words from the same transaction. See 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24(1982). 
Id. In so holding the court observed that: 
Previously we have held that two causes of action are the same if they 
rest on the same "state of facts," and the evidence "necessary to sustain 
the two causes of action" is of the same kind or character. Schaer v. 
State, 657 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1983). More recently, however, we 
have moved toward the transactional theory of claim preclusion 
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espoused by the Restatement (Second). 
Id. 
Not only could the Appellant Baird's claim for attorney fees have been brought 
in the trial court, it was heavily litigated in the trial court. Accordingly, there is no 
real issue regarding the second requirement for claim preclusion. 
The third requirement is that there be a final judgment on the merits. The 
District Court's November 19, 2010 order incorporates the terms of the court's July 6, 
2010 order and disposes of all outstanding motions and issues before the trial court, 
which operates as a dismissal of the action on the merits. See Dennis . Vasquez, 2003 
UT App 168, t1f 7-10, 72 P.3d 135 (Ut. App. 2003) ( a dismissal of an action on terms 
precluding further litigation of the claims in the action is a dismissal on the merits). 
C. IN UTAH SETTLEMENTS ARE STRONGLY FAVORED 
"It is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of disputes. Such 
agreements under the proper circumstances may be summarily enforced." 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987)). 
The policy of Utah courts favoring settlement agreements is based on the 
benefits accruing to the parties and the courts: 
%[2 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that f[i]t is a basic rule that the 
law favors the settlement of disputes.' Mascaro, 741 P.2d at 942. Such 
'[settlements are favored in the law, and should be encouraged, because 
of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to the 
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judicial system.' Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 
P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979). Moreover, the Court noted, fso simple and 
speedy a remedy serves well the policy favoring compromise, which in 
turn has made a major contribution to its popularity.' Id. at 609 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). Thus, 'the trial court has power to 
summarily enforce on motion a settlement agreement entered into by 
the litigants while the litigation is pending before it.' Id. (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
TJ13 The determination of whether to enforce a settlement agreement is 
governed by 'basic contract principles.' Mascaro, 741 P.2d at 942. The 
Mascaro Court noted that 'whether a court should enforce such an 
agreement does not turn merely on the character of the agreement.' Id. 
Rather, a settlement agreement 'constitutes an executory accord. Since 
an executory accord "constitutes a valid enforceable contract," basic 
contract principles affect the determination of when a settlement 
agreement should be so enforced.' Id. (footnotes and citations omitted)." 
In re Adoption of EM., 2004 UT App 419, ffif 12-13, 103 P.3d 177 (UT App 2004) 
The Appellant repeatedly asserts that it never signed a settlement agreement. 
But no one in the action below signed a settlement agreement because the settlement 
agreement was recited into the trial court record and stipulated to by the parties. In 
that regard, "[i]t is of no legal consequence that the parties have not signed a 
settlement agreement." Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d at 941, n.2. And, in any event, 
"Utah law simply does not require settlement agreements to be written to be 
enforceable." Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 
482 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, the Appellant Baird's assertion that he never signed 
the settlement agreement not only ignores his status as a privy of NAR, it has nothing 
to do with whether the settlement agreement is enforceable against him. 
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X. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellant Baird claims the settlement agreement entered into by his privy 
NAR should not be enforced against him because he has an attorney fees claim 
against the Appellee Aubrie Vermillion and her legal counsel. But as was shown 
above, that settlement agreement could only have been entered into with the express 
permission of the Appellant Baird. And his attorney fees claim is based on the notion 
that despite the fact that his counsel failed to confer with the Appellee's counsel to 
resolve a discovery dispute, as required by the former Ut. R. Civ. P. 26(c), he should 
be awarded attorney fees. Further, that discovery dispute ceased to exist as of 
September 17,2007. 
The claim for attorney fees the Appellant Baird wished to litigate is the same 
claim for attorney fees specifically settled by the parties on July 7, 2009. A final 
judgment on the merits was entered terminating the prior action on the basis of that 
settlement. Accordingly, as a privy of NAR the Appellant Baird is precluded from 
again prosecuting the same claim for attorney fees against the same parties. 
The Appellant Aubrie Vermillion respectfully requests that an order issue from 
this Court dismissing the within appeal. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009, 2:30 P.M. 
-oooOooo-
[Excerpt of proceedings.] 
THE COURT: Okay. Everyone go ahead and be 
seated, please. We are back on the record with the jury 
present in the jury box. Counsel also present. 
MR. ADY: I believe we would like to approach, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Oh, sure. Come on up. 
(Discussion at bench.) 
THE COURT: We need to excuse you for one more 
very quick issue. It should help. Okay? Take them back, 
Elaine. 
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Go ahead and be seated. 
We are on the record. Let me know where you are 
on this, counsel. Who would like to speak? 
MR. ADY: I understand that what we've got is 
plaintiff will pay the defendant $1,000. The debt will be -
or the claim for the debt will be extinguished and expunged 
from Ms. Vermillion's credit reports, all credit reporting 
agencies to which the debt has been — the claimed debt has 
been reported will be expunged forthwith. There will be a 
confidentiality provision as to the $1,000 only, that 
neither party will disclose it to any other third party. 
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They can talk about the settlement; they can't talk about 
the $1,000. 
And that there will be no - it will not be 
characterized as a forgiveness of debt, for tax purposes. 
There's not going to be any form sent to my client saying 
that they've been - I forget the tax number, it escapes me, 
of the IRS form. 
THE COURT: It's sort of like a 1099, isn't it? 
Or a -
MR. SCOFIELD: 1099. 
MR. ADY: Yeah, 1099. There we are. There won't 
be a 1099 sent to them. And - and we're also going to 
release Dr. Baird from any claims as well. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ADY: Is there anything else? 
THE COURT: Is that the. agreement, Mr. Scofield? 
MR. SCOFIELD: Let me just clarify my 
understanding on the confidentiality of the $1,000 payment. 
It's no reference to there being a payment, not necessarily 
just the amount. And the release would be as to NAR, its 
officers, agents, Dr. Baird, his officers, agents and both 
of their attorneys. And, likewise -
THE COURT: It's meant to be - it's meant to be -
includes that he was meant to -
MR. SCOFIELD: All the investment as well as the 
4 
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other way, yeah. 
THE COURT: All claims both ways. 
MR. ADY: Yeah. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Right. And then with respect to 
clearing up the credit, I don't know that I necessarily 
agree with the "forthwith," but I would say -
THE COURT: That one struck me. As soon as you 
reasonably can. You won't get it done forthwith. Forthwith 
is when they put you in handcuffs and take you through that 
door. 
MR. ADY: Right. 
THE COURT: That's forthwith. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Right. Well, we'll do is as soon 
as reasonably practicable. And I think we should be able to 
get a check to them — 
MR. ADY: I think the language on the credit, if I 
may just interpose, NAR does not directly control the 
database of credit reporting agencies. All they can do is 
make requests. Either they're — they're requested, but 
there aren't any requests (inaudible). The language in the 
agreement needs to reflect that that is their obligation to 
make this request. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Your Honor, the issue is not to 
force Experian — 
THE COURT: But you'll make the request in the -
5 
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1 in the most effective form you — 
2 MR. ADY: Absolutely. 
3 MR. SCOFIELD: What NAR does, it submits a form 
4 called a UDF or an AUDF, Uniform Data Form, to the credit 
5 furnisher to the credit reporting agency. And if they send 
6 in - I don't know if they use - I would imagine they're 
7 using Metro 2 and doing the AUDFs. If you're doing the 
8 Metro 2 format, you simply have to indicate on there that 
9 there is no debt and — 
10 MR. ADY: Right. But they don't have to 
11 (inaudible) occasionally that, but once — 
12 THE COURT: You're not guaranteed what they do. 
13 MR. ADY: Yeah. And we're not going to guarantee 
14 Experian's performance. We can only guarantee that NAR will 
15 go through the proper channels, commercially reasonable 
16 channels, that it will use the same format that they 
17 normally use. There's no reason — NAR doesn't want this on 
18 their — on Ms. Vermillion's credit. They want to comply. 
19 But there's no reason to saddle any obligations — 
20 J THE COURT: Mr. Saxton seemed to have a concern. 
21 I don't know if they've resolved the point that you're — 
22 MR. SAXTON: The funds you're referring to, 
23 Mr. Ady, are outdated. We don't use those any more. It's 
24 an electronic submission now. 
25 MR. ADY: (Inaudible). 
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1 MR. SAXTON: It's an electronic submission, not 
2 necessarily that, but it is an electronic submission. And 
3 we'll electronically submit it to have it updated. 
4 MR. ADY: Okay. And if — and I guess - you know, 
5 my understanding is they, can take it off. You know, if 
6 they - and our position is that if it doesn't come off, 
7 there's not a settlement; is that right? 
8 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to go down that 
9 road. They can only do what they can do. If they don't 
10 I submit, there's not a settlement. That would be a failure 
11 of consideration. But since they don't control the other 
12 end... 
13 MR. ADY: Well, that's - that's where the 
14 difference is. 
15 THE COURT: Then let's bring the jury in. Because 
16 they can only do what they can do.. 
17 MR. SCOFIELD: Well, and then one thing -
18 MR. ADY: Well, I'm just saying, Chip - Chip, if I 
19 call you, you'll help me, right? If I call you and say, 
20 "Hey, these guys are being butts; will you — will you make a 
21 phone call for me?" 
22 MR. SAXTON: What I do know - what my experience 
23 is, Mr. Ady, I can't direct you as to your — your client 
24 directly. But my experience is that, if there is some sort 
25 of an issue like that, that it's fairly easily cleared up 
7 
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with the credit reporting agencies. The person affected 
just needs to contact the credit reporting agencies, file a 
dispute, the dispute comes back to NAR, and they say, "Hey, 
what's going on?" And they say, "No, take it off. Take it 
off." And so then it's - it's all done. 
MR. SCOFIELD: I think what we can agree to do is 
everything that can be"-— can be done to notify a credit 
reporting agency that there's no debt. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what -
MR. ADY: I still won't act, then the remedy comes 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, I think, because 
they're reporting a debt that doesn't exist anymore, so — 
MR. SAXTON: And -
MR. ADY: Because it's later debt. And so 
you're -
THE COURT: And you think that's going to happen. 
MR. ADY: And the reporting cycle's every 30 days. 
So you're going to submit it within the next — 
MR. SAXTON: We can do it electronically, 
manually, on demand. So — 
MR. ADY: Okay. 
MR. SAXTON: - if this happens, I'll call my 
office on the way back, tell them to delete it and they'll 
electronically submit it to have it deleted. 
MR. ADY: And there's going to be transparency for 
8 
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bet. 
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to add? 
MR. 
can see what you've done and submitted? 
SCOFIELD: We'll send you -
SAXTON: We can send — we can send a notice 
ve done it. 
SCOFIELD: Whatever we have consented. 
SAXTON: Yeah, we can. We can do that, you 
COURT: So do we have an agreement now? 
ADY: All right. 
COURT: Mr. Scofield, anything else you need 
SCOFIELD: Just when can we get them a check 
and how do you want it made out? 
MR. 
MR. 
And 
the payments; 
ADY: Just to me in trust. 
SCOFIELD: You in trust for a thousand. 
the only other point would be those are all 
otherwise, everyone bears their own attorneys 
fees, costs and expenses. 
THE COURT: Absolutely. It's got to be that. 
MR. SCOFIELD: And that's my understanding of the 
agreement, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Saxton, as president of 
NAR and (inaudible): Are you willing to abide by this 
agreement as stated, sir? 
MR. SAXTON: Yes, I am. 
9 
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THE COURT: The plaintiff - the party is 
Ms. Vermillion, but I'd like to hear from both of you if 
you're willing to abide by this. 
MR. ADY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms, Vermillion, you accept it? That's 
a yes, but I — I note — I'm pretty sure no one's happy. I 
also think you've all done the right thing. And I'm sorry 
things had to get to this point. 
I'll approve the settlement. I'll look forward to 
concluding documents. 
Are you going to draft those, Mr. Scofield? 
MR. SCOFIELD: I'd be happy to, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
May I release the jury? 
MR. SCOFIELD: You may. 
MR. ADY: You may, sir.. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SCOFIELD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was 
concluded at 2:39 p.m.) 
-000O000-
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§ 40 JUDGMENTS, SECOND Ch. 4 
(§ 84, Tent .Draf t No. 2.) This 
Section is new, having no counter-
par t in the first Restatement. A 
stipulation or other agreement to 
be bound by another 's action can 
be viewed as essentially a mat ter 
of contract law. An express 
agreement between the parties to 
be bound by the outcome of an-
other action is effective according 
to its te rms to foreclose the par-
ties' opportunity to litigate. See, 
e.g., Sampson v. Sony Corp. of 
America, 434 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 
1970); Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-
op Bank, 7 Mass.App. 153, 386 N. 
E.2d 775 (1979). Arrangements 
under which the resolution of is-
sues in a pending action will be 
t reated as determinative in paral-
lel litigation may, however, be 
reached not only through bilateral 
agreement of the parties but also 
through agreement involving the 
court itself, often as a concommi-
tant of a ruling by the court con-
cerning consolidation or severance 
of cases or trial schedules. 
Whether such an agreement has 
been reached depends on the cir-
cumstances, and cannot properly 
be inferred simply from the fact 
that the party in question request-
ed or acquiesced in a trial sched-
ule designed to accommodate oth-
er related litigation. See Zdanok 
v. Glidden C o , 327 F.2d 944 (2d 
Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 
934, 84 S.Ct. 1338, 12 L.Ed.2d 298 
(1964) (alternative holding); 
Chitwood v. Myers, 60 Tenn.App. 
1, 443 S.W.2d 827 (1969); see 
Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 
671 (6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 
See Appendix for Court Ci 
I'S N O T E 
416 U.S. 956, 94 S.Ct. 1970, 40 L. 
Ed.2d 307 (i*74), on remand, ° ° " 
F.Supp. 908 (S.D.Ohio 1975); cf. 
Council Bros. v. Ray Burner, Inc., 
473 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1973). 
In some instances, preclusion 
has been imposed apparently on 
the basis of implied agreement, 
but in circumstances of considera-
ble ambiguity. See Cauefield v. 
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876 
(5th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389 U. 
S. 1009, 88 S.Ct. 571, 19 L.Ed.2d 
606 (1967). The holding in Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 89 S.Ct. 
1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969), on re-
mand, 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969), 
rev'd, 401 U.S. 321, 91 S.Ct. 795, 
28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971), reh. denied, 
401 U S . 1015, 91 S.Ct. 1247, 28 L. 
Ed.2d 552 (1971), indicates that 
doubt should be resolved against 
imposing preclusion. At any rate, 
the question is more clearly posed 
in these terms rather than 
through an unexplicated concept 
of "privity," e.g., United States v. 
Burlington Truck Line, Inc., 356 
F.Supp. 582 (W.D.Mo.1973); Proc-
tor & Gamble Co. v. Byers Trans-
portation Co., 355 F.Supp. 547 (W. 
D.Mo.1973), or "control" of the 
first litigation, cf. Spargur v. Day-
ton Power & Light Co., 152 N.E. 
2d 918 (C.P.Ohio 1958), aff'd, 109 
Ohio App. 37, 163 N.E.2d 786 
(1959). Doing so helps avoid un-
warranted extension of preclusion 
to a party who, though similarly 
situated to a party with whom he 
is collaborating, has nevertheless 
preserved his right to present his 
tions and Cross References 
Ch. 4 PARTIES AND OTHER PERSONS § 4 1 
case for himself. Humphreys v. Jurisdiction § 4453; Note, 56 Ca-
Tann, supra; see Edward Petry & lif.L.Rev.Harv.L.Rev. 1485 (1974). 
Co. v. Greater Huntington Radio But cf. Vestal, Res Judi-
Corp., 245 F.Supp. 963 (S.D.W.Va. cata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 
1965) Wright, Miller & Cooper, So.Calif.L.Rev. 357 (1974). 
Federal Practice and Procedure: 
§ 4 1 . P e r s o n Represented by a Party 
(1) A person who is not a party t o an ac t ion but w h o is 
represented by a party is bound by and ent i t led t o t h e 
benef i ts o f a judgment as t h o u g h he were a party. A 
p e r s o n is represented by a party w h o is: 
(a) The trustee of an estate or interest of w h i c h t h e 
person is a beneficiary; or 
(b) Invested by the person w i t h author i ty to repre-
sent h i m in an act ion; or 
(c) The executor, adminis trator , guardian , conserva -
tor, or s imilar f iduciary m a n a g e r of a n interest o f 
w h i c h the person is a benef ic iary; or 
(d) An official or agency invested by law wi th a u -
thor i ty to represent the person's interests; or 
(e) The representat ive of a c la s s of persons s imi lar ly 
s i tuated, designated as such wi th the approval o f t h e 
court , o f which the person is a member . 
(2) A person represented by a party to an ac t ion is 
bound by the judgment even t h o u g h the person h i m s e l f 
does not have not ice of the ac t ion , is n o t served w i t h 
process , or is no t subject to service of process . 
E x c e p t i o n s to this general rule are stated in § 42. 
C o m m e n t : 
a. Rationale. A pe r son whose i n t e r e s t s a r e d r a w n in to liti-
ga t i on m a y be afforded the oppor tun i ty to be h e a r d c o n c e r n i n g 
t h o s e i n t e r e s t s t h r o u g h the med ium of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . T h e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e may be cons t i tu ted upon the occasion of t h e liti-
ga t ion for t h e pu rpose of p r o t e c t i n g the i n t e r e s t s of a p e r s o n 
w h o c a n n o t legally or prac t icably par t i c ipa te in t he l i t iga t ion 
See Appendix for Court Citations and Cross References 
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NORTH AMERICAN RECOVERY 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUTTE610 • SALT LAK£ CITY, UTAH 8410 \ TELEPHONE: (801) 364-0777 • TOLLFREE: 1-800-364-6445 • FAX: (801) 364-0784 
ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT 
his Agreement dated D ^ c 1^ z&ot> , between N.A.R., Inc. (North 
imerican Recovery), hereafter referred to as Agency, and 
A&'l 6 /*>a,vd ft.D-^, hereafter referred to as Client. NAR 
nd Client are sometimes referred to as the "Parties" or a "Party" as the context may require. 
IAR is in the business of collecting past due accounts, and desires to assist Client in collecting 
ast due accounts; and Client desires that NAR assist Client in collecting past due accounts. 
IOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby 
cknowledged, the Parties agree as follows: 
. Client agrees to periodically assign, at its sole discretion, accounts to NAR for the purpose 
f collection. Accordingly, Client hereby transfers, assigns and sets over to NAR, Client's 
laims and demands against all debtors assigned together with all of Client's rights, title and 
iterest therein, and the demands represented thereby, and all rights of action accrued or to 
ccrue. Client further grants to NAR, subject to the limitations contained herein, full power to 
ollect, compromise, reassign, or in any other manner enforce the collection thereof. 
. Assignments shall be made by forwarding collection accounts to NAR. Each time NAR 
sceives accounts from Client, NAR will send Client an Acknowledgment Report. Appearance of 
n account on the Acknowledgment Report or appearance of the account on a Statement or 
tatus Report shall evidence that the account has been validly assigned ("Assigned Account") 
ursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
. Client represents and warrants that each Assigned Account represents a legal and lawful 
ebt which is in fact due and owing to Client. Client further represents and warrants that, 
nth respect to each Assigned Account, all amounts which Client has sought to recover on any 
jch account, and all amounts which Client represents to NAR are due and owing at the time 
le account is assigned to NAR, are in fact legally and lawfully owed to Client pursuant to the 
greement between Client and the person(s) owing the debt, and/or pursuant to applicable 
iw. 
. NAR will indemnify and hold harmless Client from and against any and all claims, 
Dunterclaims, liabilities or demands arising from errors, omissions, or any unlawful acts by 
AR ("NAR Caused Claims"). NAR further agrees to defend Client against any and all NAR 
aused Claims. NAR shall be entitled to select counsel of its own choosing to defend Client 
gainst any and all NAR Caused Claims. Notwithstanding NAR's right to select counsel under 
us paragraph, Client shall have the right to reject the counsel chosen by NAR, and to retain 
)unsel of Client's choosing to defend Client against any NAR Caused Claims. However, in the 
/ent Client, for any reason, rejects the counsel selected by NAR, and/or in the event Client 
sleets counsel other than the counsel chosen by NAR, to defend Client against any NAR 
aused Claims, NAR will be relieved of any, and will have no further obligation to indemnify, 
)ld harmless or defend Client from and against any and all NAR Caused Claims. 
Client will indemnify and hold harmless NAR and its owners, members, shareholders, 
fleers, directors, employees, attorneys or other agents (collectively referred to as "NAR 
jrties") from and against any and all claims, liabilities or demands arising from errors, 
nissions, or any unlawful acts by Client and/or Client's employees, independent contractors 
agents (the "Client Parties"), or arising from the falsity or breach of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law L brary, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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any of Client's representations or warranties. In the event any person(s) from whom NAR 
seeks to collect on an Assigned Account asserts any claims, counterclaims, liabilities or 
demands against NAR or the NAR Parties based on the conduct of Client and/or the Client 
Parties ("Client Caused Claims"), Client agrees to indemnify and hold NAR and the NAR Parties 
termless from, and agrees to defend NAR and the NAR Parties against, any and all such Client 
:aused Claims. NAR and the NAR Parties shall be entitled to select counsel of their own 
:hoosing to defend against any such Client Caused Claims, and Client agrees to pay the costs, 
:ees and expenses incurred by NAR and/or the NAR Parties in connection with defending 
against any such Claim. 
3. Client authorizes NAR to endorse for deposit, and collect such negotiable instruments as 
MR may receive that are -made payable to Client. In the event Client receives payment from a 
jebtor on an Assigned Account, Client shall, within 48 hours of the receipt of any such 
>ayment, notify NAR of all such payments in order to comply with the Fair Debt Collections 
Practices Act or other applicable law. 
i. NAR will provide Client with a monthly Status Report on or about the 15th of each calendar 
nonth. This report will list all active accounts, the current balance, and the most recent 
:ollection notes made while attempting to collect the account. All monies due Client from NAR 
vill be paid to Client by the 15th of each month following the month collected. In the event 
JAR makes a payment to Client based upon a check received from, or on behalf of, a debtor, 
md in the event the check that resulted in the payment from NAR to Client is returned unpaid 
o NAR, Client agrees to reimburse NAR the amount of money received by Client and which is 
lerived from or attributable to any such returned check. 
. NAR shall use its best efforts to attempt to collect, without legal action, each Assigned 
ccount. In the event NAR's efforts to collect an Assigned Account without legal action are 
ot successful, and if NAR determines legal action is required to collect an Assigned Account, 
IAR may commence legal action to collect such an Assigned Account. Accordingly, before 
ommencing any legal action to collect an Assigned Account, NAR shall provide Client with 
otification of NAR's decision to commence legal action. Upon receipt of such notification 
Kent shall promptly notify NAR if Client does not desire to commence legal action. In the 
/ent Client does not promptly notify NAR after receipt of notice from NAR that NAR intends 
> commence legal action, Client shall be deemed to have authorized NAR to commence legal 
l ion, and NAR may then commence such legal action as NAR deems appropriate. In the 
/ent Client notifies NAR that Client does not want NAR to commence legal action, NAR will 
Dt commence legal action but NAR may, and NAR's discretion, continue other efforts to 
)llect the Assigned Account. 
NAR shall not enter into any agreement for the reduction, settlement or compromise of an 
;signed Account without prior approval from Client 
l. Client will not be billed for attorneys fees, court costs, process service fees, commissions 
any other amounts unless an Assigned Account is withdrawn, canceled or settled by Client 
£r it has been validly assigned. In the event Client withdraws an Assigned Account at any 
ie, Client will reimburse NAR for all attorneys fees, court costs, process service fees and 
ler costs and expenses incurred by NAR in connection with attempting to collect on the 
thdrawn account. Client will also pay NAR a commission at the applicable commission rate 
t forth in 
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he Commission Schedule below. Client shall be obligated to pay NAR said commission 
egardless of whether NAR or Client has collected or otherwise received any money or 
layment from the debtor in connection with the withdrawn account; and Client shall pay to 
IAR all monies due under this paragraph within thirty (30) days after notifying NAR that an 
ccount is being withdrawn by Client. 
1. All payments received by NAR and/or Client will be applied in the following order: court 
osts, service of process fees and other costs and expenses associated with commencing and 
ursuing legal action, attorneys fees, damages, interest, and principal balance. NAR shall be 
ntitled to retain and/or receive all attorneys fees, court costs, service of process fees and 
ther costs and expenses associated with commencing and pursuing legal action, interest, 
nd/or damages collected by NAR and/or Client while an account is assigned to NAR. 
2. Either Party may terminate this Agreement by providing sixty (60) days advance written 
otice to the other Party. Upon termination of the Agreement, Client shall have the option to 
a) leave all Assigned Accounts with NAR, which NAR shall continue to attempt to collect under 
le terms of this Agreement, or (b) withdraw all Assigned Accounts and pay NAR the 
ommissions on such withdrawn accounts at the corresponding commission rate at the time of 
jch termination, together with all costs, expenses and attorneys fees incurred in connection 
fith the withdrawn accounts. 
3. NAR shall have the absolute right to reject or otherwise refuse to accept the assignment 
f any account and/or cancel back to Client any Assigned Account. In the event NAR cancels 
n account back to Client, NAR shall provide written notice to Client that an Assigned Account 
being canceled. The cancellation of any Assigned Account by NAR to Client, regardless of 
hether such reassignment is done voluntarily by NAR or at the request of Client, shall not 
ilieve either NAR or Client of any other obligations they may have under this Agreement, 
eluding without limitation, the obligations relating to indemnification and duty to defend. In 
ie event any Assigned Account is canceled back to Client for any reason, NAR shall be 
ititled to retain all monies relating to said account which NAR may have collected or may 
we been paid under this Agreement at time of the cancellation. 
\. In the event of a dispute over or relating to the terms of this Agreement or any Party's 
irformance under this Agreement, the prevailing party in any proceeding brought in 
mnecrjon with the dispute shall be entitled to recover from the other party its costs, 
:luding reasonable attorneys fees, whether incurred in litigation or otherwise. 
i. The Parties agree and acknowledge that this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
ttween the Parties, and that this Agreement supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations, 
oposed agreements, agreements or representations, whether written or oral, between the 
rties. This agreement also covers every Assigned Account regardless of when the account 
is assigned. The Parties agree that their relationship is contractual only, and that nothing in 
s Agreement shall be interpreted or construed to create a fiduciary relationship between the 
rties. The Parties expressly acknowledge and agree that NAR is not, and shall not be 
emed to be, acting as a fiduciary for and on behalf of Client. 
. Any written notices to Client under this Agreement shall be provided to Client at the 
dress and facsimile number set forth below. Any written notices to NAR under this 
reement shall be provided to NAR at the address and facsimile number listed below. 
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COMMISSION RATE SCHEDULE 
A. DEFINITIONS 
Assigned Amount: the original amount assigned to NAR for collection as listed on the 
Acknowledgment Report, 
i. Regular Account: any Assigned Account with respect to which legal action has not 
been commenced, and which has not been forwarded to an out of state agency for 
collection, 
ii. Other Account: any Assigned Account (a) with respect to which legal action has been 
initiated, (b) which has been forwarded by NAR to an out of state agency for collection, 
or (c) which is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding involving a debtor. 
J. COMMISSION RATES 
Regular Accounts: 33.34% of all monies collected and applied to the Assigned Amount. 
i. Other Accounts: 50.00% of all monies collected and applied to the Assigned 
Amount 
H&t'l 6. Oaird D-D-s. 
iompany Name (Client) 
5^ LP- IQthOO 5 . 
ddress 
t>mtUJ , I1T ^09 3-
ity State Zip 
~Tc>f\{ UtK&e& P i V v w ^ d J A w d > V t a f a r 
Dntact name and title 
lone #: Sot - ^ 7 £ - 9
 7<?^T ' 
#: Bo I- 676-47 &(„ 
»x 
7 no 
ithorized Client Signature 
NAR., Inc. 
Attn: David J. Saxton 
10 West Broadway, Suite 610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Facsimile No. (801) 364-0784 
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